Energy Frontlines: This is not a game, Europe needs resilient energy infrastructure

December 18, 2025

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EIES and CEPS[1] hosted a closed-door war-gaming workshop and roundtable on 19 November in Brussels, focusing on shocks to Europe’s energy systems and supply chains. Led by Gatehouse Advisory Partners[2], the scenario-based exercise tested how Europe’s energy security reacts to shocks and how threats are perceived, challenging participants to rethink resilience strategies as risks evolve.

Executive Summary

It is early 2027, just months before the French presidential election. Lithuania, a country on NATO’s Eastern front, has just assumed the EU presidency when a blackout cripples Northern Europe. Flights are grounded, transportation and logistics freeze and digital services collapse. The EU and NATO enter emergency consultations, but the cause remains unclear, with explanations ranging from grid overload and ageing infrastructure to technical failure and hybrid attack.

This story was part of three scenarios explored in the war game, which also examined a global supply chain shock and a dramatic slowdown in US LNG exports coupled with the consolidation of a BRICS energy bloc. The simulation unfolded across three escalation rounds, testing inter-institutional, cross-sectoral and cross-border collaboration, decision-making amid uncertainty and communication in crisis response.

The exercise provided an opportunity to recognise gaps, assess inter-institutional coordination and build situational awareness across sectors. Participants included energy developers, utilities, NATO, the European Commission, governments, civil society, manufacturers, technology providers and investors. They highlighted the need for enhanced coordination and communication given the interdependence of energy, trade, digitalisation and security, as well as the urgent need for proactive resilience measures.

Key Takeaways

  • Security considerations need to be integrated into all policy areas, ensuring that industrial, economic and defence strategies are aligned and mutually reinforcing, particularly in energy, critical raw materials (CRMs) and digital infrastructure.

  • Resilience needs to become a holistic concept, encompassing preparedness, diversification and strategic investment, rather than just withstanding shocks, moving from reactive to proactive resilience, e.g. institutionalising regular stress-test and developing stockpiling strategies.

  • Europe needs an assertive mindset in global energy and supply chain negotiations to avoid marginalisation, while maintaining core European values to ensure mutually beneficial partnerships.

  • There is a need to accelerate investment in technological innovation, focusing on AI, grid management and CRM processing to reduce dependencies on single-source external suppliers, particularly China.

  • European countries need to develop strong and proactive communication strategies to strengthen and maintain public trust and coordination during disruptions, ensuring transparency and clarity on risks and responses.

  • There is a need to foster cross-sectoral and cross-border collaboration, particularly between the EU and NATO, as well as between governments and industry to enhance situational awareness and resource-sharing in emergencies.

  • Europe must invest in skilled talent and innovation ecosystems, attracting expertise and building competence in critical technologies and infrastructure repairs.

Discussion

The discussion revealed the need for a cohesive, long-term strategy that balances economic, industrial, and hard security priorities. The workshop highlighted the interconnectedness of modern threats, where energy disruptions, digital dependencies, and hybrid attacks create cascading risks across sectors. For instance, the digital and energy domain will be increasingly interconnected: a large-scale blackout is not only going to cripple energy systems but also disable 4G/5G networks, impact water management, halt transportation and logistics, and disrupt financial transactions, with profound economic and social consequences.

Participants and experts stressed that resilience must go beyond responding to shocks to include proactive preparedness, diversification and strategic investment. The financial and human costs of inaction such as airport closures, supply chain collapses, and public panic were highlighted as key drivers for urgent reform.

A recurring concern was Europe’s overreliance on external suppliers for critical technologies and resources, which has been a dependency that developed over decades. There is a need to pursue structural changes, including investing in grid infrastructure and storage solutions, indigenous cybersecurity and accelerated investment in domestic innovation and manufacturing.

The discussion concluded that Europe’s future resilience hinges on its ability to act cohesively, balancing economic pragmatism with strategic autonomy. The need for greater coordination between the EU and NATO was identified as important to prepare for energy crisis situations. Participants agreed that Europe must clarify its global stance - assertive yet values-driven – while investing in the talent, infrastructure, and alliances necessary to secure its energy and industrial future.

Round 1: Communication and coordination are key

The first round simulated a large-scale blackout across Northern Europe, coinciding with disruptions to domestic mining operations and supply chain bottlenecks affecting current operations and the energy transition. Experts noted that while Europe’s power systems have grown accustomed to volatility, the scale and cascading impacts within the scenario reveal vulnerabilities when exposed to high-impact, lower-probability events.

Experts warned that prolonged disruptions risk eroding public trust in governments and institutions, particularly if communication failures amplify panic. The asymmetric nature of hybrid threats – where low-cost, high-impact attacks exploit and magnify systemic weaknesses – was identified as a key issue, requiring sound frameworks for risk assessment and mitigation and crisis response.

Participants stressed that uncertainty over attribution - whether the blackout resulted from technical failure or hybrid warfare – should not be allowed to paralyse immediate crisis response. Predefined resilience and escalation protocols must be established to ensure rapid restoration of critical services and anticipation of possible follow-up outages.

The discussion emphasised the critical role of infrastructure interdependence, highlighting how transport, energy and digital infrastructures are connected, and the need for a paradigm shift in regulation and response strategies. Finland’s, Estonia’s and Norway’s "total defence" models were cited as best practices for combining top-down coordination with bottom-up resilience.

Participants noted that communication – both among European governments and to the public – is essential to restore services and maintain social cohesion. Backup communication systems, such as satellite phones or redundant networks, are crucial in scenarios where digital and telecom infrastructure fails. Some European countries like Finland are likely to have better crisis response and preparedness frameworks because of their whole-of-society approach, sector-specific plans and regular exercises. This confirms the utility of regional cooperation in sharing resources, such as gas and oil stockpiles.

Another issue was the prioritisation of protecting critical infrastructure (CI), including hospitals, ports and airports, which require uninterrupted power and backup systems to ensure safety. The discussion revealed the need for adequate battery storage or generator capacity to prevent prolonged outages.

Key responses

  • Adopt a "total defence" culture across Europe, integrating civilian and military response frameworks to enhance coordination during crises.

  • Prioritise CI resilience, ensuring hospitals, ports, and airports have backup power systems (e.g., generators, battery storage), communication channels (e.g., satellite phones) and vetted personnel for emergency response.

  • Develop crisis communication protocols to maintain public trust and reduce panic, including loudspeaker systems for emergency broadcasts and unified government-energy operators messaging.

  • Establish regional resource-sharing agreements for gas, oil, and components stockpiles, enabling cross-border support during disruptions.

  • Invest in real-time incident tracking and attribution capabilities to distinguish between technical failures and hybrid attacks, while ensuring rapid response protocols are not delayed by incomplete information.

  • Strengthen local preparedness plans, leveraging decentralised resilience models to ensure community-level response capabilities.

  • Enhance NATO-EU coordination on energy infrastructure protection, leveraging Article 2 (economic security) and Article 3 (collective resilience) of the 1949 Washington Treaty to address hybrid threats as acts of economic warfare.

Round 2: “Made in Europe” and done in Europe

The second round examined the impact of simultaneous disruptions to Europe’s technological sovereignty, threatening economic stability, energy security and public services. The story explored a sudden unavailability of mature-node semiconductors, which underpin telecommunications, shipping logistics and data centres, and can pose an immediate operational threat. China’s control over semiconductor and rare earth element (REE) supply chains leaves Europe vulnerable to export bans and price manipulation. Experts warned that a three- to six-month disruption in semiconductor supply could cripple trade flows, financial transactions, and industrial production.

The round revealed the issue of a potential slowdown of Europe’s energy transition due to supply chain disruptions. For example, delays in importing grid components such as power semiconductors or transformers could stall energy projects and weaken grid stability.

The discussion highlighted the need for a fundamental shift in Europe’s industrial and economic security mindset. Experts argued that short-term solutions, such as stockpiling semiconductors or rerouting supply chains are insufficient without long-term investments in domestic production, recycling, and skilled labour. Participants noted that Europe must pursue diversification strategies, such as incentivising technology transfers, building domestic manufacturing capacity and forging new alliances to reduce dependencies.

Participants again stressed the urgent need for a proactive approach. It was suggested that Europe must prioritise building competence in key sectors, such as semiconductor fabrication and REE processing to achieve meaningful independence. European governments and energy companies could also enter into long-term agreements with upstream suppliers to secure uninterrupted access to critical components such as some advanced semiconductors, which cannot be stockpiled.

The financial sector’s role in mitigating supply chain shocks was also a key point of debate. Experts recommended leveraging financial tools, such as export credit guarantees or rapid-reaction funding, to accelerate the movement of goods and equipment during crises. However, they acknowledged that building true resilience will take years, requiring sustained investment in raw materials, processing facilities and alternative supply routes. Strengthening alliances with partners, such as Japan, South Korea and India was also highlighted as a necessity.

Key Responses

  • Diversify supply chains by investing in domestic and allied production, building mutually beneficial partnerships and enabling technology transfer to reduce reliance on single-source suppliers, especially when stockpiling strategies are not sufficient.

  • Accelerate REE and critical mineral processing capacity in Europe to cut dependency on Chinese refining, leveraging recycling and circular economy strategies to mitigate shortages.

  • Develop a European "resilience premium" framework that accepts higher costs for secure, diversified supply, including long-term stockpiling strategies for essential components.

  • Strengthen cross-border cooperation on skilled labour mobility and industrial competence-building, focusing on CI repairs and advanced manufacturing.

  • Establish a crisis coordination mechanism for sharing critical components (e.g., semiconductors, grid equipment) among EU and NATO member states and prioritise energy infrastructure in supply chain agreements. Utilise a standardised identification system for materials and spare parts.

  • Integrate financial tools to expedite the movement of goods during disruptions and support rapid industrial scaling.

Round 3: Urgency of technological sovereignty  

The third round examined a scenario in which Europe faced unprecedented strain due to a severe cold spell, forcing a 30% reduction of US LNG exports. At the same time, China and Russia deepened energy cooperation through the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline and BRICS-linked energy channels, additionally strengthening the role of the yuan globally. In parallel, China offered select EU countries access to its advanced, AI-enabled grid management services to help stabilise stressed national power networks, causing division within the EU.

Experts cautioned that gas shortages could exacerbate social and political tensions and fuel populist movements and disinformation campaigns that exploit public anxiety. The lack of preparedness for prolonged energy disruptions, particularly in countries unaccustomed to heating shortages, was identified as a major vulnerability.

The scenario raised questions about Europe’s technological sovereignty, particularly in AI and grid management systems. Experts argued that investing in skilled talent and fostering domestic innovation are critical to securing Europe’s energy future. Participants agreed that Europe must accelerate investment in domestic AI and innovation that can improve grid operations, potentially partnering with countries such as Japan and South Korea. The progress in fusion energy was noted as a potential long-term energy generation solution.

Participants stressed the need for a mindset shift, where energy security – both supply and infrastructure, is treated as a strategic priority. This includes integrating security concerns into infrastructure planning and development, from cross-border interconnections and grid modernisation to improving grid efficiency and capacity through smart electricity grids, energy storage, automation and AI-based tools. Experts noted that diversifying suppliers of both energy and infrastructure-related technologies is key to reduce risk exposures. The discussion emphasised the need for long-term strategic planning to avoid new dependencies, particularly in energy transition and digital technologies.

Key Responses

  • Accelerate investment in domestic AI and grid technologies, including critical components manufacturing, to strengthen grid resilience, drive European technological innovation and reduce dependencies, especially on Chinese technologies and supply chains.

  • Conduct regular stress-tests, war-gaming and long-term scenario planning to anticipate and mitigate systemic risks such as energy supply shortages and maintain a “total defence” or “whole-of-society” approach (round 1), creating collaborative frameworks across central and local government, businesses and civil society.  

  • Prioritise long-term infrastructure and energy system resilience by integrating security and resilience considerations (security-by-design) into infrastructure development, including cross-border interconnections, grid modernisation and grid-enhancing technologies like storage and analytical tools.

  • Invest in skilled talent and innovation to build domestic competence in the manufacturing and development of critical technologies and attract expertise back to Europe.

Conclusion

Europe needs to align short-term crisis management capabilities with long-term energy, economic and security strategies. The discussions revealed that while Europe can potentially excel at reacting to immediate crises, it suffers from insufficient strategic foresight, coordination and assertiveness required to anticipate and mitigate strategic and systemic risks, particularly in energy, digital infrastructure, and CRMs.

Europe needs to combat psychological and cultural barriers to resilience, including its tendency to prioritise short-term comfort over long-term security and its frequent complacency after crises subside. This also means recognising external dependencies and their implications more honestly, including the need to understand what Europe needs from China. Simply thinking strategically about shocks does not lead to action. Institutionalising a "preparedness mindset" through regular stress-testing, cross-sectoral scenario gaming and clear communication of risks to policymakers, industry, investors and the public could address some of those challenges.

[1] This brief only reflects the aggregated views and discussion that took place during the event. As an institution, CEPS takes no position on questions of European policy.

[2] Gatehouse Advisory Partners ran the workshop but were not involved in formulating specific policy recommendations.

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